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1. Introduction 
The level and structure of taxes and benefits have been the subject of much attention and 
discussion in recent years in EU countries. It has been suggested that disincentives generated 
by the structure of tax-benefit systems are one cause of low employment and slow economic 
growth in the European Union (European Commission, 2000). Tax-benefit systems create 
incentives that influence the behaviour of both employees and firms. On the demand side, 
high tax burdens can increase the cost of labour. On the supply side, generous out-of-work 
benefit payments may lead to reduced efforts to seek employment and high marginal tax rates 
reduce the reward for additional work efforts (Carone and Salomäki, 2001). 
Eight new member states, formerly planned economies from Central and Eastern Europe, 
(here and afterwards abbreviated as NMS-8) that entered the EU in 2004 have had rapid 
economic reforms since 1990s, but still in several new member states the unemployment rate 
have remained high and the employment rates low. Meanwhile, considerable differences exist 
in labour taxation and disincentives created by tax-benefit systems. 
The existing literature suggests that different labour market institutions, including 
characteristics of tax-benefit systems, can explain differences in unemployment and 
employment patterns between developed countries (see for example Daveri and Tabellini, 
1997; Nickell and Van Ours, 2000; Belot and Van Ours, 2004; European Commission, 2004; 
Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel, 2005). Most of the studies find that labour market institutions, 
including labour taxation and unemployment benefits matter for unemployment and/or 
employment performance. 
In this paper we analyse whether cross-country differences in employment and unemployment 
rates in the eight new member states can be explained by the characteristics of tax and benefit 
systems. We use macro-level panel data from eight countries over the years 1998-2004.  We 
apply graphical analysis and panel data regression models to investigate whether the variation 
in the incentives in the tax and benefit systems, measured by the tax wedge and marginal 
effective tax rates, can explain variation in the employment and unemployment rates. In our 
regression models we also control for other macroeconomic variables that may influence 
labour market developments, like GDP growth, inflation and openness. 
Compared to previous cross-country studies that have used similar approaches (e.g. OECD, 
2005, chapter 3; or European Commission, 2004) we specially focus on the new member 
states from Central and Eastern Europe. As in our case the time series is considerably shorter 
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we have to rely on simpler econometric models and we cannot directly compare our results 
with previous studies on the EU-15 countries or OECD countries. To allow some 
comparability we also estimate the same models for the old EU countries. 
Although the period we study is determined by the availability of the data, going further back 
into the past would not help much, because at the beginning of the transition period other 
factors (e.g. privatization, foreign direct investments, and legal and institutional reforms, etc.) 
were more important for labour market outcomes than the tax-benefit systems (see also 
Nesperova, 2002 and Vodopivec et al., 2003).  
In our analysis we focus on the importance of the tax-benefit systems, while we do not 
consider in this paper other labour market institutions (e.g. employment protection legislation, 
minimum wage, union density, co-ordination of wage bargaining). Previous studies have 
shown that other labour market institutions are generally less rigid or their effect on 
employment is smaller in new member states than in the EU-15 (e.g. Cazes, 2002; Ederveen 
and Thissen, 2004; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2005; Eamets and Masso, 2004).1 
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 gives a brief overview of 
previous studies on the impact of taxes and benefits on labour market outcomes in Central and 
East European new member states. Section 3 gives background data on the labour markets 
and on taxes and social expenditures in the new member states. Section 4 uses cross-country 
and panel data analysis to study the relationship between incentives in tax-benefit systems and 
labour force participation, employment and unemployment. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Previous empirical research on labour markets in the 
new member states 
There are a few studies which have analysed cross-country differences of labour market 
institutions, including tax-benefit systems, and their impact on labour market outcomes in 
new member states or transition countries. The dominant conclusion from previous studies is 
that although labour market institutions are less rigid and labour markets are more flexible in 
the new member states than in the EU-15, taxes and benefits still influence employment and 
unemployment rates.  
                                                 
1 Another part of TAXBEN project (work package 3) focuses among other things more specifically on other 
labour market institutions in new members states and their impact on employment and economic development. 
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Ederveen and Thissen (2004) analyse whether labour market institutions can explain 
differences in unemployment rates in the new EU member states (Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic). Among other factors, they consider unemployment 
benefit replacement rates and benefit duration, tax wedge, and minimum wages. They find 
that labour market institutions in the new member countries (acceding countries at that time) 
were less rigid than in the EU-15. Unemployment benefit replacement rates are lower and 
duration is shorter, wage bargaining generally takes place at the firm level, employment 
protection legislation is less strict, and minimum wages as a percentage of average wages are 
lower. (The same conclusion is reached also by Boeri and Garibaldi (2005)). Based on 
predictions from a regression analysis, Ederveen and Thissen (2004) conclude that labour 
market institutions can explain only a small part of unemployment in the new EU member 
states. However, the authors point out that heterogeneity exists among the new member states. 
In some of them, labour market reforms could prove a key issue in improving employment 
performance. 
Lenain and Rawdanowicz (2004) analyze the reasons behind low employment rates in Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (CEE-4). They conclude, however, that the factors 
explaining low employment in the CEE-4 do not appear to be very different from those 
explaining low employment in several countries of the European Union. They propose that 
among other things, low employment is related to: a) high social benefits, high early 
retirement benefits (which were initially introduced to ease the impact of transition reforms), 
b) high labour taxes, especially for low-skilled, c) high minimum wages, d) strict dismissal 
laws. Also Burns and Kowalski (2004) conclude that low employment and activity rates in 
Poland are among other things caused by unemployment traps and poverty traps in the 
existing benefit systems, accompanied by inefficient targeting of social transfers. 
Cazes (2002) analyzes labour market institutions in transition countries and concluded that 
while the countries have adopted institutions broadly similar to those in the EU, high labour 
taxation is where the countries rank among the highest. She found that overall and long-term 
unemployment rates were not significantly affected by the replacement rate and duration of 
unemployment benefits. Also employment protection legislation did not affect unemployment 
rates, but she finds that payroll taxes are positively correlated with unemployment rates, in 
particular long-term and youth unemployment rates, suggesting that a reduction of payroll 
taxes might lead to lower unemployment rates,. 
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In addition to macro-level aggregate analyses, there are many microeconometric studies on 
new member states that have focused on some aspect of the tax-benefit system and labour 
market. Several studies have analysed the impact of the unemployment insurance system on 
duration of unemployment (see also Vodopivec et al. (2003) for an extensive list of studies). 
Vodopivec (1995) showed that in the Slovenian unemployment system at the beginning of 
1990s the recipients of unemployment compensation tended to stay formally unemployed 
until their benefits expired. The study suggested that reduction of duration of benefits would 
reduce the unemployment and its duration, while not impairing job matches. Lubyova and van 
Ours (1997) studied the impact of the Slovak unemployment compensation system on the 
flows from unemployment to job and to inactivity in 1994 and 1995. Their results indicated 
that there were no disincentive effects of the benefit system. Ham, Svejnar and Terrell (1998) 
analyzed the effects of various variables on the duration of unemployment in Czech and 
Slovak Republics in 1991-1993. Their results showed that the unemployment compensation 
had positive but small effects on the duration of unemployment spells in both countries. 
Terrell and Sorm (1998) analysed the impact of unemployment benefits on unemployment 
duration in the Czech Republic 1992-1994 and found no significant effect of benefits on 
unemployment duration. Hungarian unemployment insurance system has been analyzed by 
Micklewright and Nagy (1995) and Wolff (1997) who used data before and after the 
unemployment insurance benefit reform in 1992-1993 respectively. They found that the 
benefit reforms increased only slightly the exit rates from unemployment to employment, but 
increased significantly the transition rate to other destination, especially to (early) retirement 
schemes. Puhani (1999) has analyzed the impact of reduction in unemployment compensation 
on unemployment duration in Poland in 1990-1991. The study found that the reform did not 
reduce the duration of unemployment for those indicating they were searching for work. Still, 
the author argues that the reform might have reduced the registration of people not actually 
searching for work.  
Van Ours and Vodopivec (2004) found a significant positive effect on the exit rate to 
employment after the potential duration of UI benefits were reduced in Slovenia in 1998. 
Hinnosaar (2004) found that receiving unemployment assistance benefits or social assistance 
benefits reduces search activity and leads to longer unemployment spells in Estonia in 1997-
2000. 
In general, previous analyses of the experiences of the new EU member states from Central 
and Eastern Europe show that although labour market institutions are less rigid and labour 
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markets are more flexible in the new member states than in the EU-15, taxes and benefits still 
influence employment and unemployment rates. The benefits and tax systems have created 
work disincentives that have influenced unemployment and employment both at macro and 
micro level. As many studies are from the period of the early transition period, it is difficult to 
disentangle the effects of transition and labour market institutions. Also the findings may not 
be transferable to the current period as the structure of the economy and labour market 
institutions keep changing, especially after joining the EU. 
 
3. Background data 
3.1. Employment rates 
Although the new Central and Eastern European member states share a similar history, they 
chose different economic and social policies, which have contributed to differences in labour 
market performance.2 Table 1 shows that there is considerable variation in labour force 
participation rates ranging from 70.2% in Estonia to 60.2% in Hungary in 2004 (column 1). 
Similarly there is a large variation in employment rates from 65.3% in Slovenia to 51.7% in 
Poland. Differences in employment rates in NMS-8 are likely the result of multiple factors, 
including differences in the tax-benefit policies. Employment rates of all new members are 
below EU-15 average (66%) and considerably below the Lisbon target for 2010 (70%) set by 
European Employment Strategy. 
There is an especially large gap between NMS-8 and EU-15 in terms of employment of young 
people (aged 15-24) and people with lowest education (ISCED categories 0-2). The average 
employment rate of young people in NMS-8 (26.4%) is about 14 percentage points lower than 
in EU-15 (40.7%). The gap for the employment rate of low-educated people is almost 17 
percentage points. As was discussed in section 2, earlier studies have already suggested that 
the relatively high tax burden of low-wage earners may be one reason behind the large 
differences. 
One of the important issues in the EU employment policy has been the employment of older 
workers and the postponement of retirement. That is seen as important both for economic 
performance and the sustainability of social insurance schemes. There are large differences in 
                                                 
2 For an overview of the main characteristics of labour market in the new member states and their developments 
since the 1990s, see for example Nesporova (1999), various issues of Employment in Europe by the European 
Commission, or Vodopivec et al. (2003). 
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the employment rate of older workers (55-64) both among the old and new member states 
(Table 1, column 5). The average employment rate of older workers (37.9%) in the NMS-8 is 
about 6 percentage points lower than in the EU-15 (44.1%). 
Table 1. Labour force participation and employment rates in new member states 2004 
Employment rate 
 
Labour 
force part. 
rate 
15-64 
Total  
15-64 
Women  
15-64 
Young 
15-24 
Elderly 
55-64 
Low-
educated 
(ISCED 0-2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estonia 70.2 63.0 60.0 27.2 52.4 24.2 
Slovenia 69.9 65.3 60.5 33.8 29.0 31.4 
Czech Republic 69.9 64.2 56.0 27.8 42.7 16.4 
Slovakia 69.7 57.0 50.9 26.3 26.8 9.5 
Lithuania 69.3 61.2 57.8 20.3 47.1 16.9 
Latvia 69.2 62.3 58.5 30.5 47.9 28.3 
Poland 63.7 51.7 46.2 21.7 26.2 16.9 
Hungary 60.2 56.8 50.7 23.6 31.1 20.9 
NMS-8 average 67.8 60.2 55.1 26.4 37.9 20.6 
Cyprus 72.7 68.9 58.7 37.5 49.9 40.6 
Malta 57.6 54.0 32.7 46.2 31.5 38.0 
EU-15 average 71.2 66.0 58.4 40.7 44.1 37.3 
EU-15 max 80.2 75.7 71.6 65.9 69.1 54.5 
EU-15 min 62.7 57.6 45.2 21.4 28.8 27.5 
Source: Eurostat database, accessed 10 March 2006. Labour Force Survey data from second quarter of 2004 for 
labour force participation rate. Note: arithmetic averages for country groups 
 
Among the NMS-8 group, the employment rate of older workers is the highest in Estonia and 
the lowest in Poland, which may be related to incentives in their pension systems. Leppik and 
Kruuda (2003) point out that the Estonian pension system includes several high-powered 
incentives to work. Replacement rates are low, the normal pension age has increased (and is 
still going to increase for women), it is allowed to combine old-age and work-incapacity 
pensions with earnings from work without limitations. Early retirement is discouraged by a 
reduction of pensions and deferred old age pensions are encouraged as the pension rises more 
than the actuarially fair amount. Sroka (2005) argues that the main reason for low labour force 
participation rates of elderly in Poland is the present social transfers system that allows early 
exit from the workforce among those aged 45 years and over. Most important are the early 
retirement schemes offered to certain vocational groups, pre-retirement benefits for 
unemployed people, and disability benefits for those who are incapable of taking up 
employment. 
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Figure 1. Labour force participation rate and employment rate in new EU member 
states in 1996-2004 
Source: Eurostat database, accessed 10 March 2006; Note: LFP rates are from Labour Force Survey data of 
second quarter. 
 
During the period 1998 and onwards employment rates first decreased and then increased in 
most of the new member states (Figure 1). Several countries, especially the Baltic countries, 
were hit by the Russian financial and economic crises in 1998-99, which lead to higher 
unemployment and lower employment. In our regression analysis below, we include GDP 
growth as an additional explanatory variable to capture the impact of changes in the labour 
demand on employment and unemployment rates. 
3.2. Structure of taxes and benefits 
This section gives a brief overview on the main features of the tax-benefit systems in the new 
member states. More thorough treatments of the tax systems can be found in European 
Commission (2005c) and of the benefit systems in European Commission (2003) and in 
European Commission (2005b). For an overview of the development of the unemployment 
benefit systems in the CEE countries, see Vodopivec et al. (2003). 
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In general, the post-socialist new member states (NMS-8) are characterised by lower taxes 
and social expenditures than the EU-15. Taxes, measured as share of GDP, are considerably 
lower in the new member states (Figure 2). In all countries of NMS-8, the share of taxes is 
lower than the EU-15 simple average of 40%. The variation of total taxes in GDP is larger 
among old members (from 50% in Sweden to 29% in Ireland) than in the new member states 
(from 40% in Slovenia to 29% Lithuania in 2003). The member states with a relatively high 
tax-to-GDP ratio also tend to collect a relatively high amount of labour taxes. Hence, 
differences in the share of total taxes in GDP are largely determined by the share of labour 
taxes. For the majority of the countries in the Union, the high share of labour taxes reflects the 
important role played by wage-based contributions in financing the social security system 
(European Commission, 2005c). Also, in the new member states the source of financing for 
social protection has experienced a gradual shift from payroll taxes and the general budget 
towards earmarked social security contributions paid by employers and employees (European 
Commission 2003). 
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Figure 2. Taxes by economic function (% of GDP) in EU countries in 2003 
 Source: Eurostat database, accessed November 2006 
 
The new member states have relatively high labour taxes (Figure 3). The average share of 
labour taxes in total taxes is about 51% in NMS-8 and 49% in EU-15. Relatively high share of 
labour taxes is partly inherited from the socialist systems and also due to low taxes on capital. 
Several new member states, especially the three Baltic countries, have lowered taxes on 
capital in order to attract foreign investments. 
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Figure 3. Taxes by economic function (% of total taxes) in EU countries in 2003 
 Source: Eurostat database, November 2006 
 
During 1996-2004, the share of taxes in GDP, including taxes on labour, has slightly declined 
in Slovakia, Poland, in Estonia, and it has remained more or less stable in other NMS-8 
countries. (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Taxes on labour and total taxes as % GDP in NMS-8 countries in 1995-2004 
Source: Eurostat database, last accessed 10 November 2006. 
 
Lower taxes in post-socialist new member states are accompanied by lower social 
expenditures. Total social expenditures vary between 13-14% of GDP in the three Baltic 
states to 25% in Slovenia (Figure 5 vertical axis and Table 2).  
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Figure 5. Total taxes and social expenditure (% GDP) in EU in 2003 
Source: Eurostat database, March 2006 
Taxes: Total receipts from taxes and social contributions (including imputed social contributions) after 
deduction of amounts assessed but unlikely to be collected 
 
Similar to old members, major expenditures go to old-age and survivors benefits, but the 
share of unemployment benefits (average 3.1% of expenditures) is considerably lower than in 
EU-15 (average 7.0% of expenditures) (Table 2). Later, we see that lower unemployment 
benefits lead also to lower effective tax rates in moving from unemployment to work. 
 
Table 2. Structure of social expenditures in NMS-8 countries in 2002 (% of total 
expenditures and GDP) 
 
 
Old age, 
survivors 
Sickness, 
health care 
Family, 
children Disability 
Unemploy-
ment 
Housing, 
social 
exclusion 
Total social 
expenditures 
% GDP 
Slovenia 46.3 31.3 8.5 8.5 3.3 2.0 24.6 
Poland 57.3 20.7 5.2 12.7 4.2 0.0 21.3 
Hungary 42.9 28.1 12.3 10.3 3.0 3.4 20.3 
Czech Republic 41.7 35.7 8.0 8.0 3.5 3.0 19.9 
Slovakia 38.5 34.2 8.0 8.6 4.3 6.4 18.7 
Lithuania 47.8 30.1 8.1 8.8 1.5 3.7 13.6 
Latvia 56.3 19.3 10.4 9.6 3.0 1.5 13.5 
Estonia 45.0 30.5 11.5 9.2 0.8 3.1 13.1 
NMS-8 average 46.8 29.0 8.8 9.5 3.1 2.8 18.1 
Malta 17.7 53.1 25.4 6.2 6.2 6.8 2.3 
Cyprus 16.1 49.1 25.5 8.1 3.7 5.6 8.1 
EU-15 average 42.9 28.0 9.2 9.3 7.0 3.6 25.3 
EU-15 max 62.2 41.4 16.7 14.0 13.1 6.6 31.3 
EU-15 min 23.7 21.0 2.6 4.9 1.6 0.0 15.2 
Source: Eurostat database, March 2006. 
Note: arithmetic averages for country groups 
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4. Can marginal effective tax rates and tax wedge explain 
differences in labour market outcomes? 
4.1. Measures of work incentives in tax-benefit systems 
Tax-benefit systems create incentives that may affect the behaviour of both employees and 
firms. High tax burdens can increase the cost of labour and therefore reduce labour demand. 
Generous social benefits may lead to reduced efforts to seek employment or remain in work 
and high marginal tax rates reduce the reward for additional work efforts.  
There is a plenty of research done to estimate the impact of taxes and social benefits on labour 
supply and demand both at micro and aggregate level. Although the empirical results vary 
depending on methods and data used, the overall picture suggests that there are four major 
cases where the structure of taxes and benefits is particularly important for the supply of labour 
(Disney, 2000; Carone and Salomäki, 2001). First, social benefits may discourage the labour 
supply of low-wage households. Married women and single parents are the most sensitive to 
participate in the labour force and change working hours. Second, high old-age pensions and 
disability insurance schemes encourage early retirement from labour force. Third, progressive 
income tax negatively influences labour supply of high wage earners. Finally, high taxes and 
high benefits may discourage the entrance of low-skilled young people into labour market. 
Previous studies have also found that taxes and benefits influence primarily the decision to 
participate in the labour market and less pronouncedly the number of working hours of the 
employed. Working hours are usually fixed by employers, unions or laws, and people cannot 
change them much.  
Taxes also affect the demand for labour, but this depends on tax incidence, i.e. who is the 
ultimate payer of the tax – employers or employees. If not associated with a reduction of the 
after-tax wage, an increase in labour taxes raises labour costs and reduces therefore labour 
demand (and employment). The empirical evidence of the effects of taxes on labour costs and 
unemployment is mixed. Some authors find significant effects of taxes on labour costs or 
unemployment, others find few effects of taxes on labour costs (see European Commission, 
2004, p 63).  
Quantifying the combined effects of taxes and benefits on the financial incentives to enter 
employment, work longer hours, or move to higher-paid jobs is a not an easy task. Measures 
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that are based solely on average taxes and social security contributions – such as tax wedges – 
present only a partial picture of the difference between gross and net income (OECD, 2005). 
Incentives generated by the tax-benefit systems can be measured in several different ways: 
1) macro level (ex post) indicators that find actual tax burden on labour or implicit tax 
burden on labour (calculated as total labour taxes as a share of labour cost or GDP); 
2) indicators based on formal tax-benefit rules for different types of typical households, 
such as OECD and EC indicators on average tax rates or marginal effective rates (e.g. 
OECD series Benefits and Wages, or Carone et al., 2003);  
3) indicators based on formal rules applied to actual distribution of households, 
estimating using a microsimulation approach. A recent international comparison of net 
replacement rates based on micro-data is provided by a EUROMOD project 
(Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2001; Immervoll, 2002; Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 
2003). 
We choose the second approach and use Eurostat structural indicators on tax wedge and 
marginal effective tax rates for stylised households to compare work incentives in tax-benefit 
systems of different countries and their possible correlation with actual labour market 
outcome.3  We use tax wedge on labour costs that is calculated as a share of taxes for a single 
person receiving 67 per cent of an average production worker's (APW) wage. The higher is 
the tax wedge, the larger is the difference between labour cost and after-tax pay to employee 
and, therefore the larger is the negative impact on employment. 
The Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) shows the amount of additional gross income that 
is taxed away as a result of combined effect of change in labour taxes and benefits (for details 
see Carone et al., 2003 or Eurostat, 2004). Note that METR does not take into account 
indirect taxes (e.g. value-added taxes or excise taxes) as the main interest lies comparing the 
states of working and receiving labour earning, on the one hand, and not working and 
receiving non-employment benefits, on the other hand. The higher is the METR values, the 
lower is the motivation to move from unemployment to employment or increase work effort 
(e.g. from part-time to full-time). 
METR for two types of transitions are now part of Eurostat structural indicators:  
                                                 
3 The indicators are constructed since 2001 by the OECD and developed jointly with the European Commission, 
see Carone et al. (2003). 
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1) METR on the move from short-term unemployment to employment with a wage equal to 
67% of the wage of APW for a single person (also called the unemployment trap; structural 
indicator no. 36);  
2) METR on the move from 33% of APW wage to 67% APW wage for a single person, and a 
one-earner couple with two children (also called the low-wage trap, structural indicator no. 
37).  
4.2. Statistical analysis 
 
In the new member states, we see considerable variation in the marginal effective tax rates 
both on moving out of short term unemployment and on increases in wages. From now on we 
use the term “unemployment trap” for METR when moving from unemployment to 
employment, and “low-wage trap” for METR when wage increases from 33% of the wage of 
APW to 67% of the wage of APW. 
The unemployment trap ranges from 87.1% in Latvia to 43.0% in Slovakia (Table 3). 
Similarly, there is large variation in effective marginal tax rates on low-wage earners – from 
22% in Slovakia to 65% in Poland for a single person, and from 20% in Hungary to 100% in 
Latvia for a one-earner couple with two children.  
´ 
Table 3. Indicators of labour supply and employment incentives in NMS-8 countries in 
2004 
 
 
Unemployment 
trap (%) 
Low-wage trap 
(%)  
(single person) 
Low-wage trap 
(%) 
(one earner couple 
with two children) 
Tax wedge on 
labour cost 
(%) 
(low wage earners) 
Latvia 87.1 46.7 100.0 41.1 
Poland 83.0 65.0 91.0 41.9 
Slovenia 80.5 34.9 26.1 39.8 
Hungary 66.0 32.0 20.0 41.5 
Czech Republic 65.0 33.0 57.0 41.9 
Estonia 50.4 28.2 80.1 38.9 
Lithuania 48.8 36.0 68.6 40.0 
Slovakia 43.0 22.0 39.0 38.8 
NMS-8 average 65.5 37.2 60.2 40.5 
Malta 67.4 15.6 15.4 18.0 
Cyprus 56.6 6.3 55.9 18.6 
EU-15 average 80.3 51.3 67.2 35.6 
EU-15 max 89.0 81.0 110.0 46.4 
EU-15 min 59.0 15.0 -12.0 15.7 
Source: Eurostat database, March 2006. See Carone et al. (2003) for methodological details of the computation 
of the indicators. Note: arithmetic averages for country groups 
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The tax wedge on low wage earners is very high in post-socialist new member states. In all 
NMS countries the tax wedge is higher than the average of EU-15 countries. In what follows 
we are analysing whether high tax wedge hinders the employment of low-wage earners in the 
NMS. 
As tax and benefit systems change slowly, the values of the indicators describing changes in 
the systems have remained relatively stable in 2001-2004 (Figures 6 and 7), expect for 
Slovakia, which according to the indicators have reduced the work disincentives. Short time 
series with little variation over time means that we have to rely mainly in cross-section 
variation trying to explain differences in labour force participation or employment rates. 
20
60
10
0
20
60
10
0
20
60
10
0
2001 2002 2003 2004
2001 2002 2003 20042001 2002 2003 2004
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary
Latvia Lithuania Poland
Slovakia Slovenia
Unemployment trap Low-wage trap, couple Low-wage trap, single
Year
 
Figure 6. Unemployment trap and low-wage traps in NMS-8 countries in 2001-2004 
Source: Eurostat database, October 2006. 
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Figure 7. Tax wedge in NMS-8 countries in 2000-2004 
Source: Eurostat database, October 2006. 
 
We continue to analyse whether the indicators on work incentives in tax-benefit systems can 
explain the variation in activity rates and employment rates. We first use simple two-variable 
scatter diagrams to plot employment and activity rates on tax-benefit indicators. In all figures 
we present data in three groups: EU-15, NMS-8 and Malta and Cyprus. For the EU-15 group 
and NMS-8 group we draw separate regression lines between the points to illustrate the 
average relationship between the variables in the two groups. 
For countries in the NMS-8 group we found a weak negative pair-wise relationship between 
the size of tax wedge and labour force participation rates and employment rates in various age 
groups (15-64, 25-54, 55-64, 15-64 women). Figure 7 graphs tax wedge and employment rate 
in the age group 15-64. We cannot see any relationship within the EU-15 group, but there is a 
negative correlation between tax wedge and employment rate within NMS-8 group. Similar 
negative relationships hold with other age groups. 
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Figure 8. Tax wedge on labour costs on a low-wage earner and total employment rate in 
EU in 2004 
Note: Linear regression lines go through countries belonging to groups EU-15 and NMS-8 respectively. 
Source: Eurostat database, October 2006.  
 
There was also a negative relationship between the unemployment trap and the labour force 
participation rates and employment rates between countries in NMS-8 group, except with age 
group 15-24, which showed the opposite result. Figure 8 gives an example of the relationship 
between unemployment trap and labour force participation rate of age group 55-64. On 
average, in the NMS-8 countries where the larger share of gross income is taxed away when 
going from unemployment to work (as the combined result of a reduction in benefits and an 
increase in labour taxes) the employment rate of older workers is lower. In the EU-15 group 
the simple pair-wise relationship is positive, but with a large variation. 
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Figure 9. Unemployment trap and employment rate of elderly (55-64) in EU in 2004 
Note: Linear regression lines go through countries belonging to groups EU-15 and NMS-8 respectively. 
Source: Eurostat database, October 2006.  
 
We find that low-wage trap indicators correlate with the share of part-time workers in 
employment across the countries (Figure 10 shows it for the indicator of single person). 
Countries where the share of income that is taxed away when increasing earnings is larger 
also have a large share of part-time workers in employment. This is both valid for EU-15 and 
NMS-8 groups. It may indicate that progressive taxes encourage part-time employment.  
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Figure 10. Low wage traps and share of part-time workers in EU in 2004 
Note: Linear regression lines go through countries belonging to groups EU-15 and NMS-8 respectively. 
Source: Eurostat database, October 2006. 
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We also find that indicator of the low wage trap for a single person is correlated negatively 
with all labour force participation rates and employment rates in various age groups between 
countries in NMS-8 group. Figures 11 and 12 show it for the young and for the elderly. It 
means that the new member states with more progressive effective taxes have lower 
employment rates. In the EU-15, on the other hand, the cross-country relationship is positive 
on average.  
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Figure 11. Low wage traps and employment rate of young people in EU in 2004 
Note: Linear regression lines go through countries belonging to groups EU-15 and NMS-8 respectively. 
Source: Eurostat database, October 2006. 
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Figure 12. Low wage traps and employment rate of elderly people in EU in 2004 
Note: Linear regression lines go through countries belonging to groups EU-15 and NMS-8 respectively. 
Source: Eurostat database, October 2006. 
PRAXIS Working Papers No. 26/2007 
 22
 
While low-wage trap indicators explain cross-country variation in usual weekly working 
hours among EU-15, there is no relationship among NMS-8 (Figure 13). This again may 
indicate that progressive taxes discourage increasing work effort in EU-15 countries. 
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Figure 13. Low wage trap (single person) and average number of usual weekly hours in 
EU in 2004 
Note: Linear regression lines go through countries belonging to groups EU-15 and NMS-8 respectively. 
Source: Eurostat database, March 2006.  
 
4.3. Econometric models 
 
Simple two-variable cross-country scatter diagrams between various labour market outcomes 
and tax-benefit indicators, presented in Section 4.2, suggested in most of the cases that there 
is on average a negative relationship between labour market outcome and the progressivity of 
the tax-benefit systems across the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. For 
the old EU members the relationship did not usually hold or was the opposite what we would 
expect.  
In order to try to control for other variables that may influence employment and 
unemployment in the new member states, we estimate regression models of the following 
type:  
itititiit smicControlMacroeconocatorsTaxbenIndiOutcomeMarketLabour εγβα +++= **  
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Under labour market outcome we consider as above employment and activity rates within 
various age, gender and educational groups, share of part-time workers, and usual weekly 
hours of work. Tax-benefit indicators potentially explaining the variation in employment and 
activity rates between countries and over time are the unemployment trap, low-wage trap 
indicators and the tax wedge. Control variables include the openness (the sum of exports and 
imports over GDP), the annual GDP growth rate, and the inflation rate (see Annex 1 for the 
definitions of the data).  
All the NMS-8 countries can be considered as small open economies. Therefore their 
employment is also influenced by developments in the export markets. We include the GDP 
growth rate and the sum of the share of exports and imports in GDP to take into account the 
cyclical effects that may influence labour demand and hence employment.4 We also include 
inflation rate (measured as the change in GDP price index) to take into account possible 
expansionary effects in monetary or fiscal policy.  
We estimate the models using the least squares method with pooled data (OLS) and fixed 
effects (FE). The fixed effects should take into account all cross-country differences that do 
not change over time, for example, other labour market institutions or cultural characteristics. 
Clearly, as both time dimension (minimum 4 years and maximum 9 year in very rear cases) 
and cross-sectional dimension (8 countries) are short, we clearly cannot control for all other 
possible covariates and the estimation results should be interpreted with caution. Very short 
panel also does not allow using more sophisticated models that allow for dynamic effects (e.g. 
by including lagged endogenous variables).  
In our models we include work incentive indicators one at a time, as there is clearly 
correlation between them and it may cause problems with multicollinearity in our small 
sample (see Table A1 in the Annex 2 for linear correlation coefficients between the levels of 
explanatory variables). We use backward stepwise regression to exclude statistically 
insignificant macroeconomic control variables (using the criterion p<0.10). 
We run separate models for the two country groups as the previously presented graphs have 
already suggested that the impact of indicators of work incentives could be different for old 
and new member states for most of the outcome variables. We also tested the equality of the 
coefficients, which could be rejected in most of the models (results are available from the 
                                                 
4 We also tried to use GDP gap (with trend found using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 25) 
instead of GDP growth, but that decreased descriptive power of the equations. The results are available from the 
authors. 
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authors). 
We do not include variables on other labour market institutions (e.g. coverage of trade unions, 
employment protection, and minimum wage) in the regression models. First, we do not have 
them for all new member states for all the years. Moreover, earlier studies have shown (see 
sections 1 and 2 above) that the potential role of other labour market institutions is rather 
unimportant, as labour markets in new member states are more flexible. Therefore when 
running the regression model in the specified form, the missing variable problem is 
presumably less important for the NMS-8 group than the EU-15 group. But as mentioned 
before, when estimating the models with fixed effects, all cross-country differences that do 
not change over time, for example, are implicitly taken into account. 
Table 4 presents the summary of the estimation results. The detailed results are given in the 
Annex 2. Table 4 shows the regression coefficients of the tax-benefit indicators (the tax 
wedge, the unemployment trap and the low-wage traps) on activity rates, employment rates, 
unemployment rates, the share of part-time workers and weekly work-hours from pooled OLS 
and fixed effects regressions. Despite our very small sample we do find statistically 
significant effects of the tax-benefit indicators in several of our regression models. As tax-
benefit systems do not change very rapidly and we have relatively short time period, it is not 
surprising that there are more significant results in pooled OLS regressions than in the models 
with country specific fixed effects. However, not all of the significant results have expected 
signs, clearly showing that we should take our results with caution. 
Generally we find that the tax wedge influences negatively activity rates, employment rates 
and work-hours. It has also negative impact on the unemployment rate and the share of part-
time workers. The regression coefficient of the impact of tax wedge on employment rate is 
about -0.7 in the model without country-specific intercepts. It means that on average an 
increase of the tax wedge by 1 percentage point reduces the employment rate by 0.7 
percentage points. In the fixed effects models of the employment rate in age group 15-64 the 
coefficient is about -0.2, although only significant in the model for men. The similar point 
estimate from an EU-15 panel data model (Employment in Europe 2004, p. 81, Table 32, 
column 1 and 5), which used longer time period and dynamic panel data models allowing 
country specific heterogeneity was -0.25. Also our own point estimate for the EU-15 countries 
using our simple model from above is practically the same -0.2 (Annex 2, Table A5, column 1 
and 2). Overall it suggests that concerning the tax wedge, its negative impact on employment 
rate is similar in the new member states. 
Table 4. Summary of the marginal effects of tax-benefit indicators on the labour market outcomes in new member states 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Tax-
benefit 
Indicator  M
o
d
e
l
 
t
y
p
e
 
 
Activity 
rate 15-64 
Activity 
rate 55-64 
Empl. rate 
15-64 
Empl. rate 
15-64 
women 
Empl. rate 
15-64  
men 
Empl. 
rate  
15-24 
Empl. rate 
55-64 
Empl. rate 
ISCED0-2 
age 25+ 
Unempl. 
rate 15+ 
Share of 
part-time 
Weekly 
work-
hours 
OLS -1.325** -1.591*** -0.684*** -0.947*** -0.450*** -0.325 -1.018** -0.691** -0.377** -0.195* -0.073** 
Tax 
wedge 
FE -0.232 -0.499 -0.225 -0.193 -0.261* 0.172 -0.696*** 0.192 0.100 -0.215 -0.049 
OLS -0.064** -0.161 0.080 0.077 0.148** 0.230*** -0.201* 0.171* -0.170* -0.045 0.083*** Unemploy
ment trap 
FE -0.013 -0.124** -0.017 0.008 -0.040* 0.016 -0.074** 0.027 0.010 -0.153*** 0.029** 
OLS -0.049 -0.222*** -0.203*** -0.172** -0.106* -0.082* -0.253** -0.425** 0.250*** -0.073** 0.040*** 
Low-wage 
trap 
(single) FE -0.006 -0.121*** -0.003 0.013 -0.016 0.001 -0.009 0.039* 0.004 -0.183*** 0.030*** 
OLS 0.065*** 0.014 -0.006 -0.008 -0.022 0.007 0.009 -0.113*** 0.085*** -0.019* 0.013** 
Low-wage 
trap 
(couple) FE 0.005 -0.046*** -0.000 0.011*** -0.010 0.009 -0.024 0.024** 0.005 0.048* 0.006 
Table in 
Annex 2  A2 A3 A4 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 
 
Notes:  
OLS – linear pooled data model without country-specific fixed effects 
FE – linear panel data model with country-specific fixed effects 
Significance levels: *** - p<0.01, ** - p<0.05, * - p<0.10. The significance levels are based on Huber/White robust standard errors.  
The tax-benefit indicators were included into the models one at a time. See Annex 2 for the details of the estimation results. 
 
The regression models with other tax-benefit indicators do not yield so consistent results. 
Concerning the unemployment trap, we find that it decreases overall activity rate (age group 
15-64) and the activity rate and employment rate of elderly (55-64). The relationship between 
the unemployment trap and employment rates in other demographic groups is not significant 
in fixed effects models, but has a wrong positive effect in the OLS models for age group 15-
24 and the low-educated. We also find that higher unemployment trap reduces part-time 
employment and increases working hours.  
Our estimates without country specific fixed effects suggest that there is negative cross-
country relationship between the low-wage trap for a single person and employment rates of 
various demographic groups (men and women, elderly, low-educated). The low-wage trap 
also increases the unemployment rate as expected, although it is only marginally significant. 
The coefficients of the low-wage trap indicator for a couple with one earner and two children 
vary their sign depending whether the fixed effects are included or not. 
Our estimation results also find that the progressivity of the tax-benefit system, at least at the 
low wage level, measured by the size of the trap indicators, is positively related to the average 
of usual weekly work-hours (Table 4, column 11) and negatively to the share of part-time 
workers (column 10). It suggests that in the countries where the system is more progressive, 
those people who work prefer to work more hours and not to be employed part-time. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we analysed whether low labour supply and employment rates in the Central and 
East European new member states (NMS-8) can be explained by work disincentives created 
by labour taxes and benefits.  
On average, labour force participation rates and employment rates are lower in NMS-8 than in 
EU-15. The gap is especially large for young people and the low-educated, where none of the 
countries in NMS-8 group was above EU average, even though there is considerable variation 
between the new member states.  
NMS-8 are characterised by lower overall tax burdens and social expenditures compared to 
EU-15. Still the new member states have relatively high labour taxes compared to their 
income levels. That also generates a relatively high tax wedge on labour cost. In all NMS-8 
countries the tax wedge is higher than the average of the EU-15 countries. On the other hand, 
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expenditures on unemployment benefits are lower and that increases incentives to leave 
unemployment. 
Our statistical and econometric analysis shows that higher tax wedge has a significant 
negative impact on labour force participation and employment rate in NMS-8. Our estimates 
suggests that an increase of the tax wedge by 1 percentage point reduces employment rate by 
0.2-0.7 percentage points, depending whether we include country specific effects in the model 
or not. Negative relationship exists both for men and women, older workers (the strongest 
effect), and low-educated people. 
Concerning high marginal effective tax rates when moving from unemployment to work 
(unemployment trap indicator), we find that they decrease the activity rate and the 
employment rate of elderly, and increase the unemployment rate. We also find some effects of 
the low-wage traps on the activity rate of elderly people and the low-educated.  
As both the time series and number of countries in our analysis is small, and in several models 
we have encountered statistically significant coefficients with unexpected signs, all the results 
should be interpreted with caution. Still, given that other labour market institutions (e.g. 
employment protection legislation, unions, and active labour market policy) are rather 
unimportant in the new member states and we observe high tax wedge and large variation in 
unemployment traps, our general results do not conflict with our expectations. Also, our 
results are compatible with earlier conclusions, for example with Cazes (2002), who found 
that payroll taxes in transition countries are positively correlated with unemployment rates. 
Several new member states have reduced or plan to reduce the tax burden of low-paid workers 
by increasing income tax allowances and/or decreasing marginal income tax rates. For 
example, Estonia has reduced the flat marginal income tax rate from 26% in 2004 to 23% in 
2006 (and it continues to decline until 20% by 2009) and has doubled the annual tax 
allowance. Also there are plans in Estonia to change the current system of subsistence 
minimum to encourage people to take up a low-paid job (as the current system generates a 
100% marginal effective tax rate over a certain range of earnings). Similarly, in the Czech 
Republic, there is the reduction of the marginal tax rates in the two lowest income tax 
brackets from 15% to 12% and from 20% to 19% in 2006 to stimulate the low income groups 
to find and maintain a job. Also the system of subsistence minimum and assistance in material 
need is changed in 2006 to increase people's motivation to work (Czech National Lisbon 
Programme (2005)). Given our results, these policies should lead to higher employment rates.  
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These simple policy measures also agree with the results of a comparative study of Estonian 
and Finnish labour markets (Paulus et al., 2006; Alho, 2006), also as a part of the TAXBEN 
project. This study suggested that in the new member states, where wages are more flexible, a 
simple reduction of marginal income tax rate and increasing tax allowance might give the best 
results to encourage the employment of low wage earners. 
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Annex 1. Data used in statistical and econometric analysis 
 
Eurostat definition Date of 
extraction 
Last 
update 
Years 
Tax rate on low wage earners: tax wedge on labour costs 30 Oct 06 29 Jun 06 1996-2004 
Tax rate on low wage earners: unemployment trap 10 Mar 06 09 Jan 06 2001-2004 
Tax rate on low wage earners: low wage trap  
(1- single person without children, 33% APW wage;  
2 – one-earner married couple, two children, 33% APW 
wage)  
10 Mar 06 09 Jan 06 2001-2004 
Employment rates in various age groups (annual 
averages), part-time workers in % of total employment 
30 Oct 06 26 Oct 06 1996-2004 
Employment rates by gender, age groups and highest 
level of education attained (%), 2 quarter 
30 Oct 06 23 Oct 06 1996-2004 
Activity rates by gender and age groups (%), 2 quarter 10 Mar 06 3 Feb 06 1996-2004 
Unemployment rates by gender, age groups and highest 
level of education attained (%), 2 quarter 
30 Oct 06 23 Oct 06 1996-2004 
Real growth rate of GDP volume – percentage change on 
previous year 
9 Nov 06 7 Nov 06 1996-2004 
Export and import as share of GDP (constant prices 10 Nov 06 7 Nov 06 1996-2004 
Inflation (GDP price index from GDP and main 
components) 
9 Nov 06 8 Nov 06 1996-2004 
Note: we do not have data for all years for all new member states 
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Annex 2. Statistical tables and estimation results of 
econometric models 
 
Table A1. Pair-wise correlation coefficients between tax-benefit indicators and 
macroeconomic variables in new member states (NMS-8) in 1998-2004 
 
 
Tax 
wedge 
Unemploy-
ment trap 
Low wage 
trap 
(single) 
Low wage 
trap 
(couple) 
GDP 
growth 
rate Openness 
Inflation 
rate 
Tax wedge 1       
Unemployment trap 0.31 1      
Low wage trap (single) 0.71* 0.61* 1     
Low wage trap (one 
earner couple with two 
children) 
0.29 0.09 0.47* 1 
   
GDP growth rate 0.23* -0.18 0.17 0.48* 1   
Openness 
(Export+Import)/GDP -0.03 -0.48* -0.28 -0.25 0.11 1  
Inflation rate 0.36* 0.31* 0.03 -0.30 0.05 -0.23* 1 
* - significant at 5% level 
Note: Time period is not the same for all pair-wise correlations, varying between 1998-2004 and 2001-2004. 
 
 
Table A2. Dependent variable: labour force participation rate, age group 15-64, NMS-8 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -1.325*** -0.232                  
 (0.099) (0.148)                  
Unemployment    -0.064** -0.013                
trap   (0.030) (0.016)                
Low-wage trap      -0.049 -0.006              
(single)     (0.057) (0.015)              
Low-wage trap        0.065*** 0.005    
(couple)       (0.020) (0.007)    
Openness 0.014**      0.025**             
 (0.007)      (0.010)             
Inflation    -0.203* -0.624** -0.201*  -0.193*   
    (0.106) (0.271) (0.107)  (0.108)    
Intercept 120.712*** 80.490*** 72.024*** 71.783*** 72.158*** 71.144*** 59.458*** 70.533*** 
 (4.166) (6.136) (2.007) (1.132) (2.305) (0.649) (2.274) (0.648)    
R2 0.780 0.952 0.058 0.963 0.177 0.963 0.412 0.963    
Obs 52 52 30 30 30 30 30 30    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: In the parentheses under the coefficients are Huber/White robust standard errors. Significance levels - *** - p<0.01, 
** - p<0.05, * - p<0.10. Backward selection of stepwise regression was used to drop insignificant macroeconomic control 
variables using the criterion p>0.10 for exclusion. Intermediate results are not presented. 
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Table A3. Dependent variable: labour force participation rate, age group 55-64, NMS-8 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -1.591*** -0.499                  
 (0.402) (0.518)                  
Unemployment    -0.161 -0.124**                
trap   (0.121) (0.045)                
Low-wage trap      -0.222** -0.121***              
(single)     (0.104) (0.039)              
Low-wage trap        0.014 -0.046*** 
(couple)       (0.042) (0.013)    
GDP growth 1.516***  2.898***  2.789*** 1.030** 3.253***             
 (0.536)  (0.731)  (0.724) (0.468) (0.632)             
Openness 0.063** 0.105***  0.135***    0.114**  
 (0.028) (0.015)  (0.048)    (0.041)    
Inflation -0.568*  -1.446**  -1.953***  -1.566** -0.491*   
 (0.295)  (0.534)  (0.531)  (0.596) (0.280)    
Intercept 89.284*** 44.464** 40.517*** 26.204** 40.873*** 43.716*** 27.251*** 26.406*** 
 (16.522) (21.239) (10.818) (10.605) (8.396) (2.599) (5.622) (8.498)    
R2 0.546 0.956 0.711 0.975 0.728 0.974 0.684 0.977    
Obs 52 52 30 30 30 30 30 30   
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
 
 
Table A4. Dependent variable: employment rate in NMS-8 (age 15-64) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -0.684*** -0.225                  
 (0.150) (0.145)                  
Unemployment    0.080 -0.017                
trap   (0.057) (0.019)                
Low-wage trap      -0.203*** -0.003              
(single)     (0.052) (0.012)              
Low-wage trap        -0.006 -0.000    
(couple)       (0.023) (0.006)    
Openness 0.031***  0.069***    0.050***             
 (0.011)  (0.021)    (0.016)             
Intercept 83.838*** 74.624*** 44.031*** 65.933*** 67.653*** 64.918*** 52.773*** 64.833*** 
 (6.354) (6.051) (6.208) (1.289) (2.222) (0.533) (3.234) (0.526)    
R2 0.338 0.825 0.287 0.948 0.334 0.947 0.250 0.947    
Obs 65 65 32 32 32 32 32 32    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
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Table A5. Dependent variable: employment rate in EU-15 (age 15-64) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -0.195*** -0.171**                  
 (0.071) (0.076)                  
Unemployment    0.273*** 0.038                
Trap   (0.084) (0.062)                
Low-wage trap      0.191*** -0.000              
(single)     (0.034) (0.033)              
Low-wage trap        0.147*** -0.003    
(couple)       (0.010) (0.020)    
GDP growth -0.691*** -0.146*                  
 (0.246) (0.086)                  
Openness  0.126***  -0.046** -0.020* -0.048** -0.030*** -0.048**  
  (0.017)  (0.022) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.021)    
Inflation -1.169***                   
 (0.385)                   
Intercept 76.994*** 49.364*** 43.957*** 56.045*** 58.355*** 80.249*** 59.312*** 58.371*** 
 (3.475) (5.156) (6.771) (4.147) (1.907) (3.385) (0.995) (1.279)    
R2 0.090 0.942 0.161 0.989 0.429 0.989 0.613 0.989    
Obs 150 150 60 60 60 60 60 60    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
 
 
Table A6. Dependent variable: employment rate, women, age group 15-64, NMS-8 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -0.947*** -0.193                  
 (0.190) (0.170)                  
Unemployment    0.077 0.008                
trap   (0.051) (0.017)                
Low-wage trap      -0.172** 0.013              
(single)     (0.065) (0.013)              
Low-wage trap        -0.008 0.011*** 
(couple)       (0.025) (0.004)    
GDP growth   0.876***  0.588**  0.800***             
   (0.212)  (0.254)  (0.220)             
Openness 0.027**  0.048**    0.031*             
 (0.011)  (0.020)    (0.017)             
Intercept 90.034*** 64.945*** 37.781*** 55.990*** 58.425*** 56.084*** 46.605*** 55.786*** 
 (7.894) (7.096) (5.666) (1.136) (3.824) (0.536) (3.572) (0.342)    
R2 0.418 0.886 0.333 0.967 0.409 0.967 0.308 0.968    
Obs 65 65 32 32 32 32 32 32    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
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Table A7. Dependent variable: employment rate, men, age group 15-64, NMS-8 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -0.450*** -0.261*                  
 (0.127) (0.156)                  
Unemployment    0.148** -0.040*                
trap   (0.055) (0.023)                
Low-wage trap      -0.106* -0.016              
(single)     (0.052) (0.014)              
Low-wage trap        -0.022 -0.010    
(couple)       (0.020) (0.009)    
GDP growth -0.401*                   
 (0.228)                   
Openness 0.041***  0.094***  0.039**  0.057***             
 (0.013)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.015)             
Intercept 80.154*** 84.486*** 40.968*** 75.800*** 63.283*** 73.705*** 57.982*** 73.841*** 
 (5.987) (6.489) (6.100) (1.572) (4.341) (0.656) (2.714) (0.775)    
R2 0.250 0.779 0.395 0.932 0.326 0.930 0.310 0.931    
Obs 65 65 32 32 32 32 32 32    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
 
 
Table A8. Dependent variable: employment rate, age group 15-24, NMS-8 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -0.325 0.172                  
 (0.229) (0.356)                  
Unemployment    0.230*** 0.016                
Trap   (0.045) (0.033)                
Low-wage trap      -0.082* 0.001              
(single)     (0.041) (0.024)              
Low-wage trap        0.007 0.009    
(couple)       (0.019) (0.015)    
GDP growth -0.369*                   
 (0.211)                   
Openness  -0.129*** 0.075*** -0.112**  -0.115**  -0.110**  
  (0.035) (0.017) (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.043)    
Inflation 0.455**    0.643***  0.739***             
 (0.180)    (0.162)  (0.231)             
Intercept 42.289*** 48.159** 0.603 50.137*** 28.161*** 51.834*** 24.072*** 50.305*** 
 (9.406) (19.449) (4.991) (8.720) (2.028) (8.241) (2.405) (8.473)    
R2 0.175 0.707 0.460 0.878 0.278 0.877 0.216 0.878    
Obs 65 65 32 32 32 32 32 32    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
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Table A9. Dependent variable: employment rate, age group 55-64, NMS-8 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -1.018** -0.696***                  
 (0.431) (0.230)                  
Unemployment    -0.201* -0.074*                
trap   (0.112) (0.040)                
Low-wage trap      -0.253** -0.009              
(single)     (0.107) (0.041)              
Low-wage trap        0.009 -0.024    
(couple)       (0.054) (0.014)    
GDP growth 1.107**  2.598***  2.178***  2.375***             
 (0.431)  (0.639)  (0.759)  (0.750)             
Openness 0.053** 0.111***  0.170***  0.186*** 0.066* 0.174*** 
 (0.023) (0.013)  (0.050)  (0.056) (0.033) (0.052)    
Inflation -0.695***    -1.313**  -1.118*             
 (0.253)    (0.550)  (0.616)             
Intercept 66.799*** 49.956*** 35.728*** 14.839 39.151*** 7.468 17.059** 11.056    
 (17.157) (10.345) (10.387) (10.533) (8.972) (10.977) (6.713) (9.602)    
R2 0.471 0.937 0.558 0.962 0.618 0.961 0.611 0.962    
Obs 65 65 32 32 32 32 32 32    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
 
 
Table A10. Dependent variable: employment rate, education group ISCED 0-2, aged 25 
and over, NMS-8 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -0.691** -0.192                  
 (0.339) (0.243)                  
Unemployment    0.171* 0.027                
Trap   (0.095) (0.029)                
Low-wage trap      -0.425*** 0.039*              
(single)     (0.110) (0.021)              
Low-wage trap        -0.113*** 0.024**  
(couple)       (0.034) (0.009)    
GDP growth   1.069***    1.076**             
   (0.323)    (0.468)             
Openness -0.030*    -0.114***  -0.056**             
 (0.017)    (0.026)  (0.027)             
Inflation 0.689*** 0.365*** 0.905* 0.400* 0.758* 0.391*  0.430*   
 (0.200) (0.126) (0.446) (0.216) (0.384) (0.210)  (0.216)    
Intercept 56.151*** 32.308*** 5.872 22.016*** 57.085*** 22.402*** 37.232*** 22.089*** 
 (13.493) (9.920) (6.304) (2.268) (7.099) (1.304) (5.101) (1.262)    
R2 0.166 0.872 0.217 0.963 0.371 0.964 0.270 0.965    
Obs 64 64 32 32 32 32 32 32    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
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Table A11. Dependent variable: unemployment rate, age group 15 and over, NMS-8 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -0.377** 0.100                  
 (0.169) (0.143)                  
Unemployment    -0.170* 0.010                
trap   (0.087) (0.023)                
Low-wage trap      0.250*** 0.004              
(single)     (0.060) (0.021)              
Low-wage trap        0.095*** 0.005    
(couple)       (0.015) (0.012)    
Openness -0.040***  -0.090***    -0.039**             
 (0.011)  (0.026)    (0.015)             
Inflation -0.308**    -0.630***               
 (0.129)    (0.208)               
Intercept 34.128*** 3.188 36.434*** 7.003*** 4.224 7.518*** 10.638*** 7.313*** 
 (6.823) (5.975) (9.100) (1.571) (2.615) (0.821) (2.454) (0.877)    
R2 0.239 0.816 0.290 0.956 0.486 0.956 0.567 0.956    
Obs 66 66 32 32 32 32 32 32    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
 
 
Table A12. Dependent variable: share of part time workers in employment, NMS-8 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -0.195* -0.215                  
 (0.115) (0.485)                  
Unemployment    -0.045 -0.153***                
Trap   (0.042) (0.044)                
Low-wage trap      -0.073** -0.183***              
(single)     (0.030) (0.028)              
Low-wage trap        -0.019* -0.048*   
(couple)       (0.010) (0.025)    
GDP growth 0.463***  0.550*** 0.677* 0.493*** 0.698** 0.648*** 0.698*   
 (0.107)  (0.100) (0.361) (0.119) (0.330) (0.136) (0.358)    
Openness -0.054*** 0.110*** -0.060***  -0.063***  -0.053***             
 (0.005) (0.038) (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.006)             
Inflation -0.267***  -0.306**  -0.445***  -0.486***             
 (0.066)  (0.132)  (0.091)  (0.122)             
Intercept 21.779*** 9.928 17.353*** 27.776*** 18.329*** 24.257*** 14.683*** 20.893*** 
 (4.498) (22.372) (3.808) (3.254) (2.355) (1.882) (1.549) (2.277)    
R2 0.640 0.871 0.785 0.974 0.808 0.981 0.799 0.971    
Obs 59 64 32 32 32 32 32 32    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
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Table A13. Dependent variable: usual working hours in main job, NMS-8 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax wedge -0.073** -0.049                  
 (0.036) (0.059)                  
Unemployment    0.083*** 0.029**                
trap   (0.018) (0.010)                
Low-wage trap      0.040*** 0.030***              
(single)     (0.009) (0.008)              
Low-wage trap        0.013** 0.006    
(couple)       (0.005) (0.006)    
GDP growth -0.186***  -0.114*    -0.239***             
 (0.064)  (0.061)    (0.075)             
Openness  -0.025*** 0.014***                 
  (0.004) (0.004)                 
Inflation 0.104**    0.236**  0.224**             
 (0.047)    (0.091)  (0.087)             
Intercept 44.554*** 48.729*** 33.675*** 39.986*** 38.316*** 40.798*** 40.245*** 41.438*** 
 (1.536) (2.875) (1.851) (0.687) (0.771) (0.315) (0.726) (0.409)    
R2 0.265 0.859 0.640 0.925 0.309 0.934 0.389 0.914    
Obs 63 63 32 32 32 32 32 32    
Country 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
See notes below Table A2. 
 
